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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Respondents-Appellants, through their attorney, Norman E.
Plate, Assistant Attorney General, submit the following reply to
the brief on appeal of petitioner-appellee Steven M. Stilling.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In his brief on appeal, Stilling asserts that the district
court correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and -6
(1995) to avoid conflict with the state and federal
constitutions.

However, his argument fails because (1) it

erroneously assumes that the statutes in question are ambiguous,
(2) it is contrary to the plain language of those sections, and
(3) it erroneously assumes that defendants' interpretation would
yield an unconstitutional result.

ARGUMENT
The district court interpreted sections 77-27-5 and -6 as
authorizing the Board of Pardons (the Board) to order restitution
in only two limited contexts, (1) when restitution was imposed by
the trial court as part of the underlying sentence and (2) when
the State, the Department of Corrections, or any other State
agency incur costs "that arise due to the petitioner's needs or
conduct."

On appeal, Stilling asserts that this interpretation

of these sections must be upheld because it avoids constitutional
conflicts.

However, this argument is faulty for three reasons.

First, Stilling7s argument assumes that sections 77-27-5 and
-6 are ambiguous.

While Stilling correctly states that statutes

should be interpreted to avoid constitutional conflicts, see
Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990), this
approach assumes that the statute in question is ambiguous and
therefore subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.
It is well settled that if a statute is plain and unambiguous, it
may not be interpreted to create an ambiguity.
788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam).

Bonham v. Morgan,

Because the statutes

in question here are unambiguous, they cannot be interpreted to
create ambiguity even in the name of avoiding constitutional
conflicts.
2

Second, Stilling's interpretation of sections 77-27-5 and -6
is contrary to the plain language of those sections.

Because a

statute should be construed according to its plain language,
Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 896 P.2d 632, 633 (Utah
1995), it is improper to interpret sections 77-27-5 and -6 as
limiting the Board's authority to order restitution to the narrow
instances proposed by Stilling in light of the plain language of
those sections.

See Aplt. Brief at 5-10.

Moreover, because his

reading of the statutes would effectively render portions of them
meaningless and void, such interpretation cannot stand.

See

Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995); accord
Ferro v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 513 (Utah App.
1992).

Accordingly, Stilling's interpretation of sections

77-27-5 and -6 as prohibiting the Board from ordering restitution
in this case is clearly contrary to the plain language contained
therein and is, therefore, incorrect as a matter of law.
Third, Stilling's argument that the district court's
interpretation of sections 77-27-5 and -6 must be upheld to avoid
constitutional conflicts assumes that the interpretation proposed
by the defendants is unconstitutional.
case.

This is simply not the

When faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute,

this Court "afford[s] the statute every presumption of validity,
3

so long as there is a reasonable basis upon which both provisions
of the statute and the mandate of the constitution may be
reconciled."

Timpanoaos Planning & Water Management Agency v.

Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist.. 690 P.2d 562, 564 (Utah
1984).

Defendants' proposed interpretation of Article VII,

section 12 of the Utah Constitution as noncomprehensive, see
Aplt. Brief at 16-21, allows this Court to interpret sections
77-27-5 and -6 according to their plain language without
rendering them unconstitutional.

In light of the general

enabling language of article VII, section 12 that u[t]he Board of
Pardons . . . may grant parole . . . subject to regulations
provided by statute," Utah Const, art VII, § 12, that section
should be read in conjunction sections 77-27-5 and -6 to allow
the Board to exercise its constitutional power to grant parole
subject to the regulations provided in sections 77-27-5 and -6.
Stilling additionally argues on appeal that section 77-27-5
and -6 violate the Utah Constitution's separation of powers and
double jeopardy clauses. Although these grounds were not relied
upon by the district court as a basis for its decision, even if
this Court chooses to address these arguments on appeal, they do
not aid Stilling's cause. While it is true under Salt Lake City
v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), that the legislature cannot
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delegate core judicial functions to another branch of government,
that is not at issue here. What is at issue is the Board's
authority to determine the appropriate conditions of parole for a
particular inmate, which clearly is within its constitutionally
delegated powers.
Nor does the imposition of restitution as a condition of
parole offend the double jeopardy clause of the Utah Constitution
for two reasons.

First, parole proceedings are civil in nature.

See, e.g., Petersen v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 1154
(Utah 1995); Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986);
see generally Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
Since double jeopardy principles only apply to subsequent
criminal proceedings, see, e.g. In re McCune. 717 P.2d 701, 707
(1986), these principles simply have no application to the
present situation.

Second, the Utah Supreme Court has

specifically stated that double jeopardy guarantees are not
violated "when a defendant is convicted of criminal charges and
those same facts are used as grounds for revoking the defendant's
parole."

Johns. 717 P.2d at 1337 (citing State v. Bullock. 589

P.2d 777 (Utah 1979)).

Similarly, since parole grant proceedings

are not criminal in nature, the imposition of restitution as a
condition of parole as a result of such a civil hearing also
5

cannot be viewed as the imposition of a second punishment for the
underlying crime.

Conditions of parole are merely that,

conditions of parole.

They do not purport to be, nor are they,

punishment for the underlying offense.

Instead, they are simply

the prerequisites to a prisoner receiving the benefit of not
having to serve his or her entire sentence.

Accordingly,

jeopardy does not attach in a civil parole hearing, and the
imposition of restitution as a condition of parole does not
violate Stilling's double jeopardy rights.
Lastly, although Stilling does not expressly challenge
defendants' argument on appeal that the district court erred in
determining that the Board's assessment of restitution as a
condition of Stilling's parole violated the Utah Constitution's
prohibition against ex post facto laws, he does cite to Smith v.
Cook. 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990), for the proposition that
application of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and -6 (1995) to him
would amount to retroactive application of those sections because
he was originally sentenced prior to the time at which those
sections were amended.

However, assessment of restitution under

those sections as a condition of parole does not increase
Stillingfs punishment.

As always, his sentence is three

one-to-fifteen year terms, and Stilling had the option to reject
6

the conditions of parole and serve out the remainder of his
sentence.

Mansell v. Turner. 14 Utah 2d 352, 353, 384 P.2d 394,

395 (Utah 1963).

As noted above, the imposition of restitution

as a condition of parole is simply that, a condition to Stilling
being permitted the privilege of parole.

Thus, no violation of

the ex post facto clause of the Utah Constitution has occurred.
See State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d 276, 278 n.3 (Utah App. 1994).
CONCLUSION
In his brief on appeal, Stilling argues in order to avoid
conflict with the state and federal constitutions, this Court
must adopt the district court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 77-27-5 and -6 (1995) as limiting the Board's authority to
order restitution to two limited contexts, (1) when restitution
was imposed by the trial court as part of the underlying sentence
and (2) when the State, the Department of Corrections, or any
other State agency incur costs "that arise due to the
petitioner's needs or conduct."

However, such interpretation

erroneously assumes that the statutes at issue are ambiguous and
is contrary to the plain language of those sections. Moreover,
the defendants' interpretation of these statutes, based on the
plain language contained therein, yields a constitutional result.
Thus, defendants ask this Court to reject the district court's
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interpretation of sections 77-27-5 and -6, as well as its
determination that those sections violated the Utah
Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws and remand
this matter for appropriate further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this olio

day of April, 1996.
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